We analyze the effects of CEO education on CEO turnover (firing and replacement) and firm performance. Our primary interest is on the role that CEO education plays in a firm's decision to replace its current CEO, the role that it plays in selecting a new CEO, and on whether CEO education significantly affects performance. We use six main measures of CEO education: whether or not the CEO attended a Top-20 undergraduate school, whether or not the CEO has an MBA, law or masters' degree, and whether or not the MBA or law degree is from a Top-20 program. Our study includes more than 14,500 CEO-years and more than 2,600 cases of CEO turnover from 1993-2007. Our results show that CEO education does not play a significant role in the decision by a firm to replace its current CEO; poorly performing CEOs are replaced, regardless of their education. Education, however, does play a significant role in the selection of the replacement CEO. There is a significantly positive correlation between the education levels of new CEOs and those of the CEOs they replace. Further, hiring new CEOs with MBA degrees leads to shortterm improvements in operating performance. We, however, do not find a significant systematic relationship between CEO education and long-term firm performance. CEO education does not seem to be an appropriate proxy for CEO ability. Our results lead to the puzzling implication that, while CEO education appears to play an important role in the hiring of CEOs, it does not affect the long-term performance of firms. 
Introduction
The cost of a college education has risen, in real dollars, by 250 to 300 percent over the past three decades, far above the rate of inflation. New York Times Sunday Book Review, 9/3/2010.
One of the primary roles of a corporate board is to hire a chief executive officer (CEO) with superior ability. CEO ability is the composition of observable and quantifiable characteristics such as education and work experience, as well as unobservable and potentially non-quantifiable characteristics such as leadership and team-building skills. The identification and measurement of CEO ability is a difficult, imprecise and expensive process as evidenced by the growing "executive search" industry, and the considerable resources that are expended in the CEO search process. Despite this costly search process, sometimes newly hired CEOs are let-go or 'fired' shortly after they are hired.
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Given the difficulty of evaluating CEO ability, objective and easily measurable characteristics such as education would be expected to play an important role in the CEO hiring process. Indeed, the large literature on "human capital" as a driver of production and economic growth highlights the importance of education as a determinant of human capital. Consequently, education is often used as a proxy for human capital in empirical studies (see Barro and Lee, 2010) . The potential importance of education in the specific context of managers is further evidenced by the rapid increase in the costs of obtaining professional management degrees such as the MBA. In light of this evidence, an important question from both positive and normative standpoints is whether, and to what extent, education matters in affecting CEO performance.
We construct a unique and comprehensive dataset on CEO educational backgrounds to examine the effects of CEO education on CEO hiring and turnover decisions as well as firm performance. Our results suggest that CEO education does significantly affect CEO hiring decisions. We, however, find no evidence of a systematic relationship between CEO education and firm performance. Overall, our findings imply that education may not be an appropriate empirical proxy for CEO ability and suggest an empirical puzzle: CEO education plays a significant role in CEO hiring decisions even though it does not significantly affect long-term firm performance.
CEO education potentially impacts CEO ability in three mutually non-exclusive ways.
First, education could potentially contribute to the CEO's knowledge, perspective and ability to understand technical and abstract concepts. Second, higher education could be a signal of the CEO's intellect and ability to persevere on challenging intellectual activities. Finally, the social networks acquired in college and graduate school can be quite helpful professionally in the future. As discussed above, however, CEO education is just one of the determinants of CEO ability. Hence, it is a priori unclear how much impact CEO education has on firm performance.
This study attempts to shed light on the relative importance of CEO education by analyzing the relationship between CEO education, CEO turnover, and firm performance. In particular, we address the following three questions.
(1) What is the role that a CEO's education plays in determining whether or not a CEO retires, leaves voluntarily or is fired? (2) What is the role that CEO education plays in the characteristics of the new CEO? (3) If CEO education is perceived to be a proxy for CEO ability, does it ultimately lead to superior firm performance following the CEO turnover? We give special attention to the unique situation of CEO turnover because it allows us to focus on the role that CEO education may play in how a corporate board goes about identifying and/or measuring managerial ability. CEO education may be one of the more objective pieces of information that the board has, and so it may be of greater significance in situations of CEO turnover. The event of CEO turnover also allows us to better assess any potential causal effects of CEO education on firm performance.
Our unique dataset contains nearly 15,000 years of CEO education data and more than 2,600 cases of CEO turnover. We construct up to 22 different measures of education based on the types of degrees received and perceived qualities of the programs. Our analysis identifies several unique findings. First, consistent with prior literature, poor performance increases the likelihood of disciplinary turnover. There is conflicting evidence regarding the impact of CEO education on disciplinary turnover. CEOs with law degrees from Top-20 programs appear to be less likely to be fired overall, while CEOs with undergraduate degrees from Top-20 schools appear to be more likely to be fired following poor performance. Taken together, our findings suggest that poor performance, rather than education, is the primary driver of disciplinary turnover. We also find some evidence of the impact of education on short-term firm performance following a turnover event. Hiring a new CEO with an MBA leads to short-term improvements in operating performance following cases of disciplinary turnover, while bringing in a new CEO with a non-MBA master degree leads to short-term declines in operating performance.
Next, we examine the characteristics of new CEOs and compare them with those of the CEOs they replace. We find significant evidence that the new CEO has a similar educational background to the replaced CEO following cases of disciplinary turnover. For example, after firing a CEO with an MBA, the firm typically hires an individual with an MBA to replace her.
After firing a CEO with a master's degree, the firm typically hires an individual with a master's degree to replace him. However, this does not hold following non-disciplinary turnover. In these cases, there is generally no relationship between the former CEO's education and the new CEO's education: at firms where a CEO with a Top-20 undergraduate degree decides to retire, the firm does not necessarily replace her with an individual with a Top-20 undergraduate degree.
Finally, we examine whether CEO education has an impact on firm performance; both short-term and long-term. We find virtually no evidence of a systematic relationship between CEO education and firm performance, suggesting that CEO education may be a poor proxy for CEO ability. We consider six primary measures of CEO education and the full sample of firms.
There is statistically weak evidence that a CEO having an MBA from a Top-20 program is associated with superior Return on Assets or Tobin's Q, and weak evidence that that a CEO having a law degree is associated with superior stock returns. However, these results are onlysignificant at a 10% confidence level, and they are the only significant relationships we observe between CEO education and firm performance. Overall, this seems to demonstrate that there is no systematic relationship between CEO education and firm performance. Boards and researchers should, therefore, use caution in using educational attainment as a proxy for CEO ability. Our findings on the effects of CEO education on CEO turnover and firm performance suggest an empirical puzzle. While CEO education does matter in the decisions to hire CEOs, it does not significantly affect long-term firm performance.
It is worth noting that the presence of a significant effect of CEO education on hiring decisions, but the absence of a significant effect on long-term performance is puzzling even in the context of Spence's (1973) classic signaling model of education. In his model, although education per se has no effect on an agent's output, it is used as a costly signal by higher ability agents to distinguish themselves from lower ability ones. Because ability affects output, there is a significant positive relation between ability and output.
We contribute to the literature by carrying out a relatively comprehensive empirical analysis of how CEO education impacts hiring and turnover decisions, as well as performance.
Using a small sample of approximately 500 firms from the year 2002, Gottesman and Morey (2006) find that school quality is not systematically related to firm performance. They also find that a CEO with a law degree or an MBA is not associated with better firm performance, but they do find limited evidence that a CEO having a non-MBA master's degree is associated with superior operating performance. Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002) utilize a larger sample of firms from the Forbes 800 list from 1987-1996, and find limited and mixed evidence of a relationship between CEO education and firm performance. They show that the quality of a CEO's graduate school is weakly negatively related to return on assets, but positively related to Tobin's Q. This limited work on the relationship between CEO education and firm performance shows that the two are, at best, weakly correlated -although the type of degree may be of importance. The relatively small sample sizes used in these studies makes it unclear whether the absence of statistical significance of the coefficients of CEO education arises from the lack of statistical power or that CEO education, indeed, has no effect on firm performance. Further, these studies do not examine the effects of education on CEO turnover. does not affect long-term firm performance.
The CEO turnover literature has largely focused on the relationship between turnover and firm performance, giving limited attention to specific CEO characteristics. Denis and Denis (1995) show that disciplinary turnover is usually the result of significantly poor operating performance and that this does lead to significant improvements in performance. Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001) show that firm performance prior to the CEO turnover is the most important factor leading to a forced CEO turnover. Consistent with the expectations of the board, Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004) show that operating performance improves following forced CEO turnover. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) further confirm prior results, and suggest that the likelihood of disciplinary turnover following poor firm performance is greater in firms with stronger corporate governance environments. While firm performance seems to be the overriding factor in leading to disciplinary CEO turnover, little attention has been given to the role that individual CEO characteristics play in the board's decision to replace the CEO.
Some prior researchhas focused on the inputs the board uses to select the new CEO.
Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen (2008) Execucomp where we identify a turnover event by a change in CEO from one year to the next.
We identify the type of CEO turnover---voluntary or forced---by manually collecting information from firm press releases regarding the turnover.
B. Variable descriptions

CEO education variables:
The 
CEO turnover variables:
In this study, we are interested not only in whether or not a CEO turnover occurred, but the conditions under which that turnover occurred. We first identify all incidences where there is a change in CEO from year-to-year using the Execucomp database.
We then manually collect information on the type of turnover by reviewing relevant press releases about the change in CEO, plus any other necessary information. We characterize all turnovers as either disciplinary or non-disciplinary depending on the nature of the change. Barber and Lyon (1996) , Core, Guay and Rusticus (2007), and Bhagat and
Bolton (2008)). Past stock return (PastReturn) is also used in our CEO turnover analyses, as we consider the impact that past performance has on the likelihood of a CEO facing disciplinary turnover. Since firing or replacing the CEO is a form of market discipline imposed by the board of directors, it is most appropriate to use a market measure of performance in this analysis. This variable is measured as the compound two-year return in years t-2 to t-1. Finally, measures of Industry Performance include the average relevant performance measure for all firms in the sample firm's 4-digit SIC code, excluding the sample firm.
Control variables:
We use additional control variables in most of our analyses whose choices are guided by the particular relationship we examine and/or the extant literature.
Leverage is calculated as the simple ratio of long term debt to total assets at the end of the fiscal year. We measure Size as the natural log of total assets for the fiscal year. The measure of Growth Expenses is calculated as the ratio of advertising plus research and development expenses to assets. 5 CEO-Own is the percentage of stock, including options, owned by the CEO.
CEO-Age is the age of the CEO at the end of the fiscal year. CEO-Tenure is the number of years that the CEO has been the CEO of the sample firm. 6 Risk is the standard deviation of the sample firm's monthly stock return over the previous 60 months. Finally, we include a number of industry controls for several variables (e.g. performance, leverage). We calculate the average value for all firms in the sample firm's 4-digit SIC code, excluding the sample firm, to use as our industry control variable. We distinguish between cases of disciplinary turnover and non-disciplinary turnover.
C. Descriptive statistics
In Panel non-law master's degree; about 5% earned both a master's and an MBA or law degree. In Panel B, we note the differences between the disciplinary turnover and non-disciplinary turnover subsamples.
Looking at the firm and CEO characteristics across sub-samples, there do not appear to be too many substantial differences. The average CEO age is 56 years old. The average age of CEOs with MBAs is slightly less, while that of CEOs with law degrees is slightly more. The average CEO tenure is 8.4 years, again with MBAs slightly less and law degrees slightly more. 
Return on Assets and
Methodology
We first focus on the relationship between CEO turnover and CEO education. We investigate whether there is a systematic relationship between a CEO's education and the likelihood of that CEO experiencing either disciplinary or non-disciplinary turnover.
Specifically, we want to determine if, given poor firm performance, CEOs with different types of education are more or less likely to experience disciplinary CEO turnover. Using the full sample of firms, we utilize a multinomial logit model to allow for different categories of CEO turnover.
The CEO Turnover variable takes a value of 0 if there is no turnover, a value of 1 if there is disciplinary turnover, and a value of 2 if there is non-disciplinary or voluntary turnover. We consider the following specification:
(1)
CEO Turnover t = CEO-Education t + PastReturn t + (CEO-Education t x PastReturn t ) + IndustryPastReturn t + CEO-Own t + FirmSize t + CEO-Age t + CEO-Tenure t
All CEO-specific explanatory variables are associated with the CEO who was replaced.
We also include an intercept term, year dummy variables, and industry dummy variables in all specifications. In this model, the explanatory variable of interest is not simply CEO-Education, but also the (CEO-Education t x PastReturn t ) interactive term. It is not just a CEO's education independent of firm performance that might lead to disciplinary turnover, but, rather, it is the education given poor performance that might lead to disciplinary turnover. If a firm is performing well, we wouldn't expect to see the CEO replaced for disciplinary reasons, regardless of their education. The interactive term allows us to isolate the effects of CEO education on disciplinary turnover when the firm is not performing well. This analysis produces two sets of results: one for non-disciplinary turnover and one for disciplinary turnover.
Consistent with Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008), we
would not expect CEO education and/or firm performance to have a significant effect on whether or not a CEO voluntarily steps down. Factors such as ownership stake, age and tenure are more likely to affect this decision by the CEO. However, disciplinary turnover is a decision made by the board of directors. As such, we expect the coefficient on PastReturn t to be negative and the coefficient on IndustryPastReturn t to be positive, suggesting disciplinary turnover occurs when the firm is underperforming. A priori, it is unclear if CEOs with higher quality education are more or less likely to face disciplinary turnover, after controlling for firm performance. If CEOs with higher quality educations are more likely to be disciplined following poor performance, we will see a negative coefficient on (CEO-Education t x PastReturn t ); if CEOs with higher quality education are less likely to be disciplined following poor performance, we will see a positive coefficient on (CEO-Education t x PastReturn t ). We perform this analysis considering the six primary measures of CEO-Education described in Section 3B.
Once we establish the general relationship between CEO turnover and CEO education, we want to better understand the characteristics and consequences of those turnover decisions, as they relate to a CEO's education. To do this, we focus on only the subsample of firm-years in which a case of CEO turnover occurred.
The first analysis using the CEO turnover subset considers whether or not hiring a new CEO with a certain education background leads to positive changes in performance following the CEO turnover. We use the following ordinary least squares model and each of the six different measures of CEO-Education for this analysis:
to t+1 = CEO-Education t + ∆Industry-Performance t to t+1 + FirmSize t + Leverage t + GrowthExpenses t + CEO-Own t + CEO-Age t + CEO-Tenure t + Risk t
We perform this analysis on the subsample of all disciplinary turnover cases and the subsample of all non-disciplinary turnover cases. 
Empirical Results
A. Education and Turnover
We begin by presenting the results of estimating specification (1) in Section 3. We consider whether a CEO's education background makes him/her more or less likely to experience disciplinary turnover following poor firm performance. Table 3 presents the reasons for CEO turnover from 1993-2007. During these fifteen years, we identified 2,615 cases of CEO turnover; of these, 34% were disciplinary and 63% were non-disciplinary turnovers (the other 3% were for special cases, such as corporate control events). For this analysis, equation (1) includes an interactive term made up of CEO education and the firm's past 2 years of stock returns. This is necessary because we are concerned about whether or not CEO education matters given poor performance, not necessarily whether it matters independent of firm performance. 9 The empirical results from estimating the effects of CEO education on CEO turnover are presented in Table 4 . Panel A presents the results on disciplinary turnover and Panel B presents the results on non-disciplinary turnover.
In Panel A, the baseline equation without any CEO education variables shows that CEOs experience disciplinary turnover when (i) the firm has performed poorly (ii) the industry has performed well; (iii) the CEO is older; (iv) the CEO is less tenured; and (v) the CEO owns less stock. These relationships are consistent with the prior literature, and these relationships persist when we include the CEO education and interaction terms in the model. When we include CEO education in the model, it rarely has any effect on disciplinary turnover. Independent of firm performance, a CEO with a Top-20 law degree is less likely to experience disciplinary turnover. This is the only significant relationship we find.
When we focus on the interactive term, we find a significant relationship: the negative coefficient on the UG-Top20 education variable suggests that, given poor performance, firms are more likely to fire a CEO with a high quality undergraduate education. We also find statistically weak evidence that, given poor performance, firms are more likely to fire a CEO with a law education, and less likely to fire a CEO with a Top-20 MBA education.
Our turnover results provide conflicting evidence regarding the effects of the quality of a CEO's education on her likelihood of experiencing disciplinary turnover following poor performance. Further, when we consider CEO-specific characteristics, CEO stock ownership and CEO tenure are both negatively related to the probability of disciplinary turnover. When deciding to replace a CEO, boards rely most on the results that the CEO has produced, while taking into account how entrenched the CEO may be through tenure or ownership. In particular, boards do not seem to consider the CEO's education background in any systematic manner when decided to replace a poor performing CEO. Our findings, therefore, suggest that poor performance, regardless of education, is the most important determinant of disciplinary turnover.
In Panel B, the baseline equation shows that performance is not a consistent determinant of non-disciplinary CEO turnover, as would be expected. Older CEOs are more likely to leave and CEOs with greater stock ownership are less likely to leave. We do, however, see several cases where CEOs with certain types of education are involved in non-disciplinary turnover.
Independent of firm performance, CEOs with an MBA are more likely to be involved in nondisciplinary turnover, while CEOs with master's degrees and Top-20 undergraduate degrees are less likely to be involved in a non-disciplinary turnover. Further, the positive coefficient on the interactive term in the UG-Top20 analysis shows that, given poor performance, CEOs with a Top-20 undergraduate degree are still less likely to be involved in a non-disciplinary turnover;
alternatively, it could be that, given strong performance, they are more likely to be involved in a non-disciplinary turnover.
Next, we focus on the effects of turnover on firm performance after the appointment of a new CEO. The analysis in Table 5 considers the relationship between the education of the new CEO and performance changes following their appointment. We estimate specification (2) Having analyzed the performance-related issues surrounding CEO education and CEO turnover, we now focus on the actual hiring decision. In this analysis, we consider the relationship between the new CEO's education background and the former CEO's educational background. We estimate specification (3) in Section 4. The results are presented in Table 6 . In
Panel A we present the results for cases of disciplinary turnover, and in Panel B we present the results for cases of non-disciplinary CEO turnover.
In five of the six specifications presented in Panel A, firms bring in a new CEO with the same type of education background as the former CEO following disciplinary turnover. The lone exception is the LAW-TOP20 variable; firms that fire CEOs with law degrees do look to replace them with a new CEO who also has a law degree, but they do not seem to focus on the quality of that law degree. These results suggest that firms education plays a key role in affecting new CEO hiring decisions, even though it is not a significant determinant of CEO firing decisions. .
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In Panel B, we find that, unlike the disciplinary turnover results, firms do not consistently bring in a new CEO with the same type of education background as the former CEO following a non-disciplinary turnover. The two exceptions are when the new CEO has a top-20 law degree or a master's degree. Interestingly, following a non-disciplinary turnover, slow growing and less risky firms are more likely to hire a CEO with a law degree. Finally, smaller and less leveraged companies tend to hire MBAs during a non-disciplinary turnover situation.
Given our previous findings, it is important to understand the larger context of the CEO turnover-related decisions. Specifically, what is the larger role that CEO education plays with respect to the overall performance of firms? The results in Table 4 show that decisions to fire CEOs are not largely related to their education. However, the results in Table 6 show that firms do look to hire CEOs with a certain educational background, which indicates that they believe that education background is important for the firm or to the position.
Is CEO education really important in affecting firm performance? To analyze this, we focus on the full sample of firms. We estimate specification (4) in Section 4. The results are presented in This result is somewhat consistent with the results in Table 5 that showed that new CEOs with
MBAs lead to higher changes in operating performance following disciplinary turnover.
However, none of the other five measures of CEO education presented in Table 7 
Discussion
We find little evidence that CEO education matters with respect to firm performanceeither short-term or long-term. While firms may enjoy some short-lived improvements in operating performance by hiring a new CEO with an MBA after firing the previous CEO, and firms may suffer some short-lived operating performance weakness by hiring a new CEO with a master degree after firing the previous CEO, these relationships do not seem to generalize to all firms nor to other measures of CEO education. However, boards do appear to use a CEO's 11 In results not presented, we considered all 22 measures of CEO education shown in Appendix A in this analysis. In total, we run 22 x 3 = 66 different specifications. Of these 66 analyses, the CEO education is statistically significant in only five of the specifications (7.6% of the cases). Three of these five are presented in Table 7 . education in assessing current or potential executives. Our findings, therefore, lead to the puzzling implication that, while education does play an important role in CEO hiring decisions, it does not significantly affect firm performance. If CEO education does not lead to superior firm performance, then why would boards consider it at all in their evaluation processes? It is perhaps due to the fact that they have few other identifiable and measurable criteria to use. All else being equal, they rely on what they believe to be the observable pedigrees of the executive.
Of course, all else is rarely equal, especially when dealing with something as nebulous and potentially unobservable as managerial talent. Interpersonal skills, leadership ability and strategic vision are among the traits that CEOs should possess; these can be difficult to identify and even more difficult to measure. As a result, boards rely on those characteristics which they may be able to observe: work experience, track record, and education.
We note the following caveats to this study. First, we only consider the education of the CEO. We do not consider the entire management team, including other managers or board members. It is possible that a firm with a management team with an overall high quality education will outperform firms with less well educated management teams. Second, we do not distinguish between types of degree within the undergraduate and master's categories.
Unfortunately, we cannot reliably distinguish between types of undergraduate or master's degrees for some CEOs because the information disclosed does not always specify the undergraduate field. Third, we do not distinguish between U.S.-based degrees and international degrees. In our sample, the number of CEOs with non-U.S. degrees is very small, so we chose to not distinguish them in our analysis. Finally, we rely on the U.S. News & World Report rankings of undergraduate, business and law schools in some of our analyses. In these tests, we are relying on these rankings as being valid measures of educational quality. While we can never be sure if these rankings are indeed correlated with educational quality, there is some anecdotal evidence that suggests they are at least related with perceived educational quality. In Appendix B we present the number of CEOs represented by each undergraduate, MBA and law program; in Appendix C we present the USNWR rankings for each type of program. There is a very high correlation between these two lists. Also, we chose to use USNWR rather than other rankings because it has the most complete rankings, covering the greatest number of schools across the three different types of programs. In comparing the USNWR rankings to other rankings, such as the BusinessWeek MBA rankings, there is a very high correlation between the lists.
Understanding a concept as nuanced as managerial ability is not straightforward. These results suggest that CEO education does not play a distinguishing role in determining a CEO's ability related to enhancing firm performance. It is certainly possible that the CEO's education does have a critical influence in determining whether or not the individual becomes a CEO (or, even earlier, whether or not the individual gets hired into positions that may lead to becoming a CEO). Nevertheless, it is still rather puzzling (at least to us) that education affects CEO hiring decisions even though it has little effect on long-term firm performance. Our findings strongly suggest that educational attainment is a poor proxy for CEO ability.
Conclusion
We analyze the relationships between CEO education, CEO turnover and firm performance using a relatively comprehensive dataset on CEO educational characteristics. We show that CEO education is not significantly related to firm performance. Our results suggest that education is a poor proxy for CEO ability. Nevertheless education does play an important role in CEO hiring decisions; boards still use educational qualifications as criteria in evaluating potential CEOs. We considered 6 primary measures of CEO education and 22 measures in total for the largest 1,500 U.S. firms during 1993-2007. The results show that firm performance is the dominant factor in determining disciplinary CEO turnover. In general, CEO education is not systematically related to a board's decision to replace the CEO. There are, however, a couple of cases where education is weakly related to disciplinary turnover: CEOs with a Top-20 law degree are less likely to experience disciplinary turnover, and, given poor performance CEOs with a Top-20 undergraduate degree are more likely to experience disciplinary turnover.
We find thatfirms look to replace a CEO with a new CEO who has the same educationtype background as the former CEO -especially following disciplinary turnover. This suggests that boards believe the individual's educational pedigree is an important qualification for meeting the requirements of being CEO at their firm, but that they don't necessarily believe that the former CEO's education is at all responsible for his/her failures -or else they would have looked to hire a new CEO with a different education. Given that the results in this study show that there is no consistent relationship between CEO education and firm performance, which suggests that CEO education is not a useful proxy for CEO ability, it seems that corporate boards should concentrate their CEO search processes on other criteria that may better predict future performance.
Appendix A -Methodology for CEO Education Variables
We rely on the U.S. (1) UG-Top10 -Equal to 1 if the CEO received an undergraduate degree from a school ranked in the USNWR Top-10 national universities, and equal to 0 otherwise.
(2) UG-Top20 -Equal to 1 if the CEO received an undergraduate degree from a school ranked in the USNWR Top-20 national universities, and equal to 0 otherwise.
(3) UG-Top50 -Equal to 1 if the CEO received an undergraduate degree from a school ranked in the USNWR Top-50 national universities, and equal to 0 otherwise.
(4) UG-Top100 -Equal to 1 if the CEO received an undergraduate degree from a school ranked in the USNWR Top-100 national universities, and equal to 0 otherwise. 
Appendix B -CEO Representation by School
The following lists show the number of CEO-years by school in the sample for the Top-30 schools for each program type. 
MBA Programs Score
( 1) Harvard 100
( 1) Stanford 100
Pennsylvania 95 (4) MIT 93 (4) Northwestern 93
Chicago 93
Dartmouth 89
UC Berkeley 89
Columbia 88 (10) NYU 84 (11) UCLA 83 (12) Michigan 82 (13) Yale 80 (14) Cornell 79 (14) Duke 79 (14) Virginia 79 (17) Carnegie Mellon 77 (18) Texas 74 (19) UNC 72 (20) Indiana 71 (21) USC 70 (22) Arizona State 69 (22) Georgetown 69 (24) Emory 68 (25) Rochester 66 (25) Washington University 66 (27) Ohio State 65 (27) Minnesota 65 (29) BYU 64
Georgia Tech 64
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